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NUMBER 1

SPEECHES
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE LAW OF UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES

Hon. Diane P. Wood*
Optimism permeates the 1937 comments of the Advisory Committee
that introduced Rule 56 of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
the world. The rule, which provided for a "[s]ummary judgment
procedure," created "a method for promptly disposing of actions in
which there is no genuine issue . . . [of] material fact."' The very name

of the device-summary judgment-promises simplicity and expedition.
According to Webster's, the word "summary" means "done or occurring
without delay or formality." 2 Wright and Miller confirm that this is what
is expected of a summary judgment motion: the rule opens the door to
prompt adjudication; it allows a party to defeat unfounded claims or
defenses with little expense; and it offers "expeditious justice" to the
*3
parties.
The only problem is that summary judgment today looks nothing like
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Delivered
as the Fifth Annual William J. Holloway, Jr. Lecture at the Oklahoma History Center,
Oklahoma City, on September 27, 2010.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's note to the 1937 adoption.
2.
3.

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2289 (1993).
10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 2712, at

198 (3d ed. 1998).
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this Utopian picture. Enormous resources go into the preparation of
summary judgment motions; courts labor over them for extended periods
of time before issuing a ruling; and appellate courts are inundated with
appeals from disappointed parties who insist that the trial court
overlooked a critical disputed issue of fact or misapplied the law. What
went wrong? Were the drafters of the rule naYve, or has something else
changed to make summary judgment the complex, time-consuming
vehicle it now so often is?
Perhaps the answer is a little of both. Recall that the drafters of the
Civil Rules also thought that discovery would be quick and inexpensive.
Bitter experience has shown us that neither is true. And, as Judge Brock
Hornby of the District of Maine commented in a recent article in the
Green Bag, the same appears to be the sad truth for summary judgment.
Here's what he had to say:
The term "summary judgment" suggests a judicial process
that is simple, abbreviated, and inexpensive. But the federal
summary judgment process is none of those. Lawyers say it's
complicated and that judges try to avoid it. Clients say it's
expensive and protracted. Judges say it's tedious and timeconsuming. The very name for the procedure is a near-oxymoron
that creates confusion and frustrates expectations.4
Professor John Bronsteen of Loyola University Chicago School of Law
had even harsher words for the present situation: summarizing his
article, Against Summary Judgment, he wrote, "Summary judgment
might be a wonderful procedure were it not inefficient, unfair, and
unconstitutional."5 With commentary like this around, we need to ask
whether, by creating a mechanism to speed things up and reduce cost, we
have inadvertently managed to slow things down and allow expenditures
to balloon.
In this lecture, I would like to explore how and why people are
increasingly worrying about these unintended consequences of summary
judgment. We can begin with a look at the early history of summary
judgment under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: how it worked,
4. D. Brock Homby, Summary Judgment Without Illusions, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 273,
273 (2010).
5. John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 522, 551
(2007).
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how it related to other procedural mechanisms (discovery in particular),
and how courts treated it. Next, I will consider when, why, and how
rapidly things changed. Finally, I'll turn to a detailed look at the latest
effort to reform Rule 56-the amendment that took effect on December
1, 2010-and I will conclude by considering whether this most recent
change will restore some of the early promise of the summary judgment
procedure or if it, too, will somehow wind up adding yet another layer of
complexity to the litigation of civil suits in the federal courts.
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE EARLY YEARS

A. The Development ofFederalRule of Civil Procedure56
The historical development of summary judgment in the United
States from the nineteenth century until the present day is complex and
interesting in its own right. For our purposes, however, it will be enough
to provide a brief survey. This will show how a procedure that was
viewed at the start as a promising and simple mechanism for clearing
crowded dockets, bringing down costs, and advancing the interests of
justice morphed into something quite different. Today, there are few
who would argue that summary judgment is living up to those
expectations. As I have already suggested, more and more people are
whispering that the Emperor has no clothes: that summary proceedings
in the federal courts, in combination with modern pretrial discovery,
have had an effect exactly opposite of that which was intended.
The American summary judgment procedure now embodied in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 has its roots in mid-nineteenthcentury England. Over the preceding centuries, English merchants had
become increasingly reliant on the common law and chancery courts to
settle debts. Other countries-our civilian friends-sent mercantile
disputes to special courts established for that purpose. Merchants in
England bemoaned the "'huge delays' in the common law courts; those
delays, they complained, "'withh[eld] petitioners from their right' and
impose[d] 'an intolerable burden of expense."' 6 In 1855, Parliament
devised a solution to the problem in Keating's Act, which was also called

6. John A. Bauman, The Evolution of the Summary Judgment Procedure: An Essay
Commemorating the Centennial Anniversary of Keating's Act, 31 IND. L.J. 329, 329
(1956) (quoting JoHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIE, ch. LII (c. 1470),
reprintedin S.B. CHRIMES, SIR JOHN FORTESCUE 131 (1942)).

HeinOnline -- 36 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 233 2011

234

Oklahoma City University Law Review

[Vol. 36

the Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act.7 The law created a
summary procedure for judgment in cases that involved liquidated claims
on commercial instruments. It entitled a party complaining of a debt to
judgment in his favor unless the defending party filed an affidavit
disputing the factual basis of the claim. Initially, the procedure applied
only in disputes over commercial instruments, but over time it was
expanded to actions to recover land and chattels, to claims for specific
performance of contracts, and beyond. The novel mechanism provided a
procedural sieve for removing sham claims and reducing delay when
there was no factual dispute requiring a court's attention.
Keating's Act was copied in America. It became a primary basis for
some of the proposals that emerged as the original Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were being drafted. There were other historical antecedents,
too, however. As early as 1732, Virginia experimented with summary
proceedings that required a party to file a motion for judgment in
advance of trial. The availability of this procedure was initially limited
to a narrow category of claims, but by 1919, Virginia had extended
summary proceedings to all actions at law.'
Nonetheless, Virginia's system was the exception, not the rule,
among the American states.9 Such widely available summary procedures
remained rare elsewhere on our side of the pond until the Federal Rules
emerged. During that era, this kind of procedure tended to be limited to
contract cases and similar disputes. As in the English system, plaintiffs
involved in summary proceedings in American state courts were entitled
to judgment in their favor for the amount claimed unless a defendant
responded with an affidavit of defense denying the right to collect.10 The
federal Conformity Act" automatically made this device available in
actions at law brought in the federal courts, so long as the state in which
the federal court sat provided for such a procedure. 12
Surveying the state of summary proceedings around the country for
7. Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict., c. 67 (Eng.).
8. A helpful discussion of the development of summary proceedings in the United
States can be found in Charles E. Clark & Charles U. Samenow, The Summary Judgment,
38 YALE L.J. 423, 463 (1929).
9. By the 1920s, only Indiana and Virginia made summary judgment procedures
available in all types of actions. See id. at 470.
10. Id. at 442, 456-57.
11. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
12. See Dempsey v. Pink, 92 F.2d 572, 573 (2d Cir. 1937) (recognizing that summary
procedures made applicable in federal court by the Conformity Act were not available in
proceedings in equity).
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an article in the Yale Law Journal in 1929, Charles E. Clark, who would
go on to lead the effort to draft the Federal Rules, extolled the virtues of
the summary procedure: "Except where a trial is necessary to settle an
issue of fact," he explained, "the whole judicial process is, by this
procedure, made to function more quickly and with less complexity than
in the ordinary long drawn out suit."l 3 Many around that time shared his
positive view of the relatively new procedure, seeing in it an answer for
overburdened courts and a foil to disputes that had no factual basis.14
Speed to judgment was not the only benefit the rule was to provide.
While "[t]he argument for the procedure most generally stressed is that it
affords a means whereby judgments may be more speedily secured,"
Clark explained:
its simplicity makes it more generally useful . . . . It also

furnishes an easy and direct way of disposing of a large amount
of important litigation and should therefore prove of great value
to the courts and the judges, and to those defendants who are
interested in the proper adjudication of their causes."
By all accounts, no one expected summary proceedings to cause much of
a problem.
And so, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect in
1938, they included a provision for summary judgment in Rule 56. But
from the moment the Rules were enacted, Rule 56 was different from the
state rules that preceded it in one critical respect: unlike the various state
summary procedures, the federal rule was not limited to any particular
type of action; it applied generally in all civil cases. 16 At the time that
the Rules took effect, the Advisory Committee noted that there had "been
13. Clark & Samenow, supra note 8, at 423.
14. See, e.g., Mac Asbill & Willis B. Snell, Summary Judgment Under the Federal
Rules-When An Issue of Fact Is Presented, 51 MICH. L. REv. 1143, 1172 (1953)
(arguing that with some care "the summary judgment procedure, without unjustly
depriving a party of a trial, can effectively eliminate from crowded court calendars cases
in which a trial would serve no useful purpose and cases in which the threat of a trial is
used to coerce a settlement") (footnote omitted).
15. Charles E. Clark, The New Summary Judgment Rule in Connecticut, 15 A.B.A. J.
82, 82 (1929).
16. FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee's note to the 1937 adoption; see also
MacDonald v. Du Maurier, 144 F.2d 696, 702 (2d Cir. 1944) ("[T]he rules, unlike all
earlier procedural systems in this country or England, make the remedy of summary
); Boerner v. United
judgment available for all-not a select few-civil actions.
States, 26 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
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a steady enlargement of the scope of the remedy" over time,17 but Clark
and others saw no good reason to limit the summary procedure to any
particular type of action; they thought that all cases might benefit from
its expected positive effect. And there we can pause to consider the
consequence of that fateful decision to give Rule 56 the same
transsubstantive effect that the drafters envisioned for the rules as a
whole.
B. An Early Look at the Consequences of UniversalApplicability
It is more than a truism to say that the wider availability of summary
judgment meant that there was a greater potential for mischief under the
new rule. Establishing a rule that could be used in all civil litigation was
naturally a more difficult project than devising one that was limited, for
example, to contract actions. As one commentator explained not long
after the passage of Rule 56, the unrestrained nature of the new rule had
the potential to cause-rather than alleviate-litigation delay: "[T]he
problem," the commentator described,
is the formulation of a workable standard for trial courts to apply
in determining the existence of issues of fact for trial. When the
summary judgment procedure was narrowly restricted to actions
for liquidated debts, this need was minimized. The extension of
the procedure to new classes of cases intensifies the need for a
standard .

. .

. [and fjailure to articulate intelligible standards in

jurisdictions where a completely unlimited summary judgment
procedure is permissible results in wasted judicial effort and
.
added delay to litigants in settling disputes . ...

The lack of intelligible standards in Rule 56 not only created the
potential for delay in resolving motions under the rule; it also created the
potential for misapplication of the rule. The wide scope of the rule,
along with the vagueness of the standards for determining whether an
issue of fact existed, meant that judges inevitably had more discretion to
dismiss a lawsuit and that the dreaded and unconstitutional "trial by
affidavit" was a real danger. Observers at the time stressed that "the
function of the court is limited to the ascertainment of the existence of an
17. FED. R. CIv. P. 56 advisory committee's note to the 1937 adoption.
18. Bauman, supra note 6, at 354.
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issue of material fact, and . . . it is not to try the issue of fact whose

existence has been so ascertained."' 9 Responding to these criticisms,
Clark maintained his steadfast support of the procedure: "It is obvious
that judges should be careful not to grant judgment against one who
20
shows a genuine issue as to a material fact," he wrote in 1952.
Just as obvious is the obligation to examine a case . . . to see that
a trial is not forced upon a litigant by one with no case at all....
Properly and responsibly applied . . . the summary judgment
procedure is an important and necessary part of the series of
devices designed for the swift uncovering of the merits and
either their effective immediate disposition or their advancement
toward prompt resolution by trial.2 1

Though Clark's comments about judicial responsibility did not answer
the question whether the rule's broad application had opened the door to
excessive judicial discretion, they reflected an attitude-or perhaps the
assumption-that the negatives of the new rule did not outweigh the
positives. In the absence of empirical evidence one way or the other,
proponents continued to believe that the rule was a "highly operable"
mechanism for resolving disputes.22 As time went on, however, it
became apparent that the rule had created an environment in which
summary judgment was becoming a procedure of huge importance to
litigants. The existence of an opportunity to persuade the judge to
exercise her discretion to end the case, looking only at affidavits and
other papers, meant that litigants were well advised to focus their
energies with that gateway in mind.
II. SHIFTING VIEWS IN THE SUPREME COURT

A. Summary Judgment as a DisfavoredDevice
For the first forty years after the adoption of the Federal Rules, the
19.
PA. L.
20.
21.
22.
MICH.

Christopher Branda, Jr., Note, Summary Judgment in the Federal Courts, 99 U.
REv. 212, 215 (1950).
Charles E. Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36 MINN. L. REv. 567, 578 (1952).
Id at 578-79.
Charles E. Clark, Edson Sunderlandand the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 58
L. REv. 6, 12 (1959).
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potential problems posed by judicial discretion did not materialize. This
may have been for the simple reason that the federal courts were
approaching summary judgment cautiously. During this period, it was
common to see statements to the effect that summary judgment was
disfavored, and courts accordingly set quite a high bar for granting
relief.23 A prime example is the Second Circuit's 1946 decision in
Arnstein v. Porter, which frames a debate over the standard for relief
under Rule 56 between two giants: Judges Jerome Frank and Charles
Clark.2 4 Frank, writing for the majority, held that the "'slightest doubt"'
about an issue of fact was enough to make summary judgment
inappropriate.25 Clark disagreed, accusing Frank of deciding the case
based on "a belief in the efficacy of the jury to settle issues . . . and a
dislike of [Rule 56]" itself.2 6
The lower courts found other ways to avoid summary judgments as
well. The Third Circuit, for example, developed a line of cases that
permitted a party opposing summary judgment to survive such a motion
by relying only on allegations in her own pleadings. This succeeded for
a time, but it ultimately led, as we will see, to the 1963 amendments to
the rule.27
Over time, the Supreme Court settled on the idea that summary
judgment was disfavored as a general matter. In Poller v. Columbia
BroadcastingSystem, Inc., decided in 1962, the Court remarked:
This rule authorizes summary judgment "only where the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, where it is quite
clear what the truth is,

. .

. [and where] no genuine issue remains

23. See, e.g., Sartor v. Ark. Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 624 (1944) ("[A]t least a
summary disposition of issues of damage should be on evidence which a jury would not
be at liberty to disbelieve and which would require a directed verdict for the moving
party."); Werner Ilsen, Recent Cases and New Developments in FederalPractice and
Procedure, 16 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1, 46 (1941) (collecting cases).
24. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
25. Id. at 468 (quoting Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 130,
135 (2d Cir. 1945)).
26. Id. at 479 (Clark, J., dissenting).
27. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's note to the 1963 amendment, which
discusses the following line of third circuit cases: FrederickHart & Co. v. Recordgraph
Corp., 169 F.2d 580 (3d Cir. 1948), UnitedStates ex rel. Kolton v. Halpern,260 F.2d 590
(3d Cir. 1958), United States ex rel. Nobles v. Ivey Bros. Construction Co., 191 F. Supp.
383 (D. Del. 1961), Jamison v. Pennsylvania Salt Manufacturing Co., 22 F.R.D. 238
(W.D. Pa. 1958), Bunny Bear, Inc. v. Dennis Mitchell Industries, 139 F. Supp. 542 (E.D.
Pa. 1956), and Levy v. EquitableLife Assurance Society, 18 F.R.D. 164 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
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for trial . . . [for] the purpose of the rule is not to cut litigants off

from their right of trial by jury if they really have issues to try."28
The Court's attitude toward summary judgment is also on display in
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., where it decided that summary judgment
should not have been granted to a moving party who failed to
demonstrate that there was a complete absence of material facts.29 In
short, before 1986, the federal courts overwhelmingly took the position
that Rule 56 was to be used sparingly.
B. Revolution in the Supreme Court
Then came the Revolution, in the form of the now-famous trilogy of
cases decided in 1986-Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp.-in which the Supreme Court reversed course.30 We were just
kidding before, the Court implied. Summary judgment was no secondInstead, the three cases
class, disfavored procedural gimmick.
cumulatively established, summary judgment was henceforth to be
regarded as a useful and integral part of the pretrial process-a great tool
not only for disposing of frivolous cases, but also for weeding out claims
and defenses that no reasonable trier of fact could uphold. The standard
to be used was the same as that for a directed verdict. In Matsushita the
Court embraced the view that a party opposing summary judgment "must
do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts." 3 1 That the dispute might be factually complex-as
the dispute in Matsushita certainly was-did not benefit the nonmoving
party. Oddly enough, the factual complexity intensified the burden on
the opposing parties to "come forward with more persuasive evidence to
support their claim than would otherwise be necessary." 32 Anderson
underscored that a party resisting summary "must present affirmative
evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary

28. Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962) (alterations in
original) (quoting Sartor,321 U.S. at 627).
29. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1970).
30. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986).
31. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586.
32. Id. at 587.

HeinOnline -- 36 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 239 2011

Oklahoma City University Law Review

240

[Vol. 36

judgment." 33 "This is true," said the Court, "even where the evidence is
likely to be within the possession of the defendant, as long as the plaintiff
has had a full opportunity to conduct discovery." 34 And, on the same day
as Anderson, the Court completed its endorsement of the liberal use of
summary judgment, writing:
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon
motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial."s
The Court explained that under Rule 56, "the mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute . . . will not defeat an otherwise properly

supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be
no genuine issue of material fact." 3 6
The Court's 1986 trilogy, like the proverbial receding water that
reveals previously hidden rocks, laid bare some of the problems that had
been inherent in the rule from the start. Summary judgment became the
focal point of litigation, rather than a rarely used device to dispose of
particularly weak cases. Judges had broad discretion to decide whether
disputed facts were really material or not, and to decide whether the
paper record put forth by the opponent of summary judgment was good
enough (maybe even persuasive enough) to reach a jury. The stakes
soared for the litigants, who learned quickly that they had to redouble
their investment in discovery so that they could present enough material
to avert an untimely demise of their cases.
III. THE PERVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF RULE AMENDMENTS AND LOCAL
REFINEMENT: MORE DELAY, MORE DISCOVERY

At the same time that the standards for summary judgment were
changing as a result of judicial interpretation of Rule 56, the Rules
Committee was tinkering with the text of the rule. Over the years, both

33.
34.
35.
36.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.
Id.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 3 22.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48 (emphases omitted).
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judges and litigants had adapted to a process in which the "pretrial" stage
resolved 98% of cases and trials nearly vanished. Summary judgment
played a major role in this evolution. Here we encounter another
unintended consequence of summary judgment: as it became ever more
urgent to amass, and then use, more supporting materials either to oppose
or support summary judgment, both costs and delays kept growing. This
happened almost imperceptibly, one step at a time.
The first set of amendments to Rule 56 came along in 1948. They
permitted a plaintiff to move for summary judgment sooner in the
litigation than the original rule had allowed, and they clarified that partial
summary judgment was possible even in cases where damages had yet to
be determined. 37 While those changes may not have been earthshattering, real change was just around the corner.
In 1963, the rule expanded the list of materials that could be
introduced in support of or opposition to a motion for summary
judgment, adding "answers to interrogatories" to the existing list. 38 This
change represented the continuation of a trend that began when the
framers of the Federal Rules adopted the English summary procedure in
1938. Recall that in the English common-law courts, the introduction of
the nonmoving party's affidavit was sufficient to oppose a claim that
The 1938 Federal Rules added
summary relief was warranted.
depositions and affidavits from people not parties to the litigation as
materials that parties could use to establish a genuine issue of fact or lack
thereof. But it was the addition of answers to interrogatories in 1963 that
had the effect of putting significantly greater emphasis on discovery as
an essential process leading up to the pivotal moment in the case: the
motion for summary judgment. The second change to Rule 56 in 1963
had a similar effect. It made clear that the party opposing summary
judgment had an obligation to respond to a properly supported motion
for summary judgment with her own evidence of a genuine issue
requiring trial. This change meant that the nonmoving party could no
longer rest on her pleadings and survive summary judgment. Instead,
active engagement was required of both sides.
As more and more materials were submitted in conjunction with the
motion for summary judgment, the trial court had more to review, and
delays inevitably followed. In addition, the judge had a more complete
view of the case, and it became ever harder to respect the often subtle
37. See WRIGHT, MILLER& KANE, supra note 3, § 2711, at 194-95.
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's note to the 1963 amendment.

HeinOnline -- 36 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 241 2011

242

Oklahoma City University Law Review

[Vol. 36

line between a case where genuine facts remained for trial (even though
the judge privately thought that one party had the stronger case) and a
case that rationally could be answered only one way.
In 2007, Rule 56 was amended again as part of the restyling of the
federal civil rules. The Rules Committee took the position that the word
"shall" is inherently ambiguous; it therefore purged that word from the
entire set of rules of civil procedure, including Rule 56. In each instance,
"shall" had to be replaced by either "must," "should," or "may." The
drafters thought that "should" was the proper word for Rule 56,
recognizing that the district court retained discretion to deny summary
judgment even when it seemed that there was no genuine issue of
material fact. 39 At the time, the change went largely unnoticed, but all of
that changed when the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules first
presented the proposed overhaul of the rule that took effect in December
2010. In the end, the Committee opted to reinstate the word "shall," and
so the rule once again reads that the "court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 4 0
I will return to the 2010 amendment to Rule 56 shortly.
Along with the amendments to the rules came changes to procedures
established by local district court rules. The procedure set out by Local
Rule 56.1 of the Northern District of Illinois, for example, requires the
moving party to provide "a statement of material facts as to which the
moving party contends there is no genuine issue" and a response from
the opposing party "to each numbered paragraph . . . including . . .

specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other
supporting materials relied upon."41 That provision of the Northern
District's rules first appeared in a substantively similar form in the mid1980s, and district judges noted that it was intended to eliminate
"circumspection, whether purposeful or not," in responses to summary
judgment.42 Approximately a third of the districts around the country
39. WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 3, § 2711, at 48 (Supp. 2010). The advisory
committee's notes to the 2007 amendments note that "[i]t is established that although
there is no discretion to enter summary judgment when there is a genuine issue as to any
material fact, there is discretion to deny summary judgment when it appears that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact." FED. R. CIv. P. 56 advisory committee's note to
the 2007 amendments.
40. FED. R. CIv. P. 56(a).

41. N.D. ILL. Loc. R. 56.1(a)-(b).
42. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Progress Record Distrib., Inc., 106 F.R.D. 25, 27 (N.D.
Ill. 1985).
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have local rules requiring a specific point-counterpoint exchange
between the movant and the party opposing summary judgment; this
explicit requirement may raise the stakes for both sides even more.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISCOVERY TECHNIQUES
AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT

At the same time as the changes in summary procedure in the federal
courts had the effect of focusing discovery practice on the summary
judgment phase of a civil action, discovery was also metastasizing. The
two are inextricably linked given the fact that the immediate point of
most discovery is for use in summary judgment motions; only if the case
manages to survive beyond that point and only then if it is not settled
would the discovery be required for a trial.
According to Professor Arthur Miller, "The contemporary perception
of a crisis in the judicial system first became prominent in the 1970s."43
This may help to explain why the Supreme Court in the 1986 trilogy
changed its view of summary judgment. The same might be said of other
amendments to the rules that were designed to expand the utility of
summary judgment. But at the same time that summary judgment was
becoming more accessible, it was widely recognized that discovery was
spinning out of control. Beginning in 1983, the Judicial Conference's
Standing Committee on Rules introduced a series of amendments to the
discovery rules that were designed to increase cooperation, to reduce
costs, and to lessen the burden on litigants and third parties. In 1983,
amendments to the discovery rules directed judges to limit redundant
discovery and imposed good-faith requirements for attorneys seeking
discovery materials. Ten years later, automatic disclosure rules were put
in place, and presumptive limits on the number of depositions and
interrogatories allowed by the parties were introduced to cabin the
44
discovery process.
It is fair to say, from the vantage point of 2011, that the problems
with discovery are far from solved. Indeed, the conference at Duke Law
School held in May 2010 by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
focused heavily on the problems of cost and delay, especially (but not

43. Arthur R. Miller, The PretrialRush to Judgment: Are the "LitigationExplosion, "
"Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Clichds Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 985 (2003).
44. Id. at 1014.
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only) problems caused by electronic discovery. (Deja vu all over again!)
Interestingly, however, not too many people have looked at the
interaction between the summary judgment rule and discovery, and
summary judgment was hardly touched upon at Duke.
Pessimists among us might be forgiven for concluding that, after
three-quarters of a century, it is quite clear that the original hopes for
summary judgment are not going to be realized. As my colleague
Richard Posner observed in the first edition of his book, The Federal
Courts: Crisis and Reform, the district courts faced a nearly 400%
increase in civil cases filed between 1963 and 1983.45 Civil caseloads in
district courts across the country continue to increase at a rate of 1% to
2% per year on average.46 In addition, even if the increase in caseload
itself were not enough, the reporting requirements in the 1990 Civil
Justice Reform Act (another effort to reduce cost and delay in the district
courts) keep a substantial amount of pressure on district judges to resolve
disputes as quickly as possible. All of this is unfolding as the federal
at the beginning of
judiciary suffers from extreme understaffing:
December 2010, ninety judgeships on the U.S. district courts stood
vacant.47
These pressures prompted then-Judge Patricia Wald to remark in
1998 that Rule 56 had serious potential to "develop

. . .

into a stealth

weapon for clearing calendars."48 There is some indication that her fears
were warranted. Five years ago, Professor Stephen Burbank of the
University of Pennsylvania wrote that, even with the serious limitations
posed by existing data, "there is a reasonable basis to conclude that the
rate of case termination by summary judgment in federal civil cases
nationwide increased substantially . . . between 1960 and 2000, with one

plausible (and perhaps conservative) range being from approximately 1.8
percent to approximately 7.7 percent." 49 Other scholars suggest that
45. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 76-77, app. B,
tbl.B.2 (1985).
46. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, FederalJudicial CaseloadStatistics, U.S. CTS.,
10-12 (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/
FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2010/front/MarJudBus2010.pdf.

47. See JUDICIALNOMINATIONS.ORG, http://judicialnominations.org (last visited Dec.

10, 2010).
48. Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1898
(1998).
49. Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil
Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 592
(2004).
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summary judgment may be catching up with settlement as a method of
disposing of cases. 50 There is also a bit of support for the proposition
that summary judgment doesn't actually prevent trials from happening at
all.
According to a number of surveys, American lawyers believe that
summary judgment is increasing in importance because of pressures on
federal trial courts. A member survey of the American Bar Association,
done in 2009, showed that 50% of plaintiffs' lawyers, 47% of defense
lawyers, and 44% of all other lawyers believe that discovery's primary
use is to develop evidence for summary judgment, not to prepare for
trial.52 Perhaps that is good; perhaps it is bad; or perhaps it is neutral.
But it is certainly a change over the course of the rule's history.
V. LESSONS FROM THE RECENT AMENDMENT TO RULE 56

Before turning to my final conclusions, I'd like to offer some
thoughts on the latest-and first comprehensive-rewriting of the rule
since its inception. Both the rule that took effect on December 1, 2010,
and the reasons why it finally assumed that form reflect the kinds of
problems that this lecture has been exploring.
There were two principal motivations behind the proposed
amendment to Rule 56: the first was a desire to bring the text of the rule
into line with actual practice around the country; and the second was the
need to establish a greater degree of uniformity among the ninety-four
federal districts. When the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules began to
work on the rule, it assigned the responsibility for developing a proposed
new rule to a subcommittee ably chaired by District Judge Michael
Baylson of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The committee's
original proposal involved several key points:
*

It recognized explicitly for the first time that a motion could seek
either full or partial summary judgment.

*

It set forth timing requirements that would apply unless local
rules provided to the contrary.

*

In subpart (c), it spelled out the procedures that had to be followed
"unless the court orders otherwise in the case." This part

50. See Bronsteen, supra note 5, at 522-23.
51. See id.
52. See Hornby, supra note 4, at 274.
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described what came to be called the "point-counterpoint
procedure" in the hearings and comments that followed.
Following the example of many local rules, it would have
required three separate filings: (1) a motion identifying each
claim or defense on which summary judgment was sought; (2) a
separate statement identifying in numbered paragraphs the
material facts that could not be disputed; and (3) a brief covering
the contentions on law or fact. The responsive brief, followed if
need be by a reply brief, was to follow the same pattern.
* The proposal would have permitted a party to accept or dispute a
fact either generally or solely for purposes of the motion.
* Supporting facts would have to be cited with particularity in the
statement of material facts, and the sources of support included
virtually everything:
depositions, documents, electronically
stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations,
admissions, answers to interrogatories, and anything else.
* Following the Supreme Court's decision in Celotex, the proposal
would allow someone to assert that the other side could not
produce admissible evidence.
* Just as in the previous version of the rule, the proposal permitted a
nonmovant to show the court that it needed more time for
discovery and to ask the court to defer ruling on the motion.
*

Finally, if a party failed to respond or failed to present proper
material in opposition, the court would be permitted to deem
admitted the facts that were not appropriately controverted.

That, in brief, was the version of the rule that went out for public
comment.
During the comment period, contributors focused almost exclusively
on two major points. The first, which I will not cover in any detail, was
whether the rule should make it clear that the district court has an
unwavering duty to grant summary judgment if the criteria in the rule are
met, and if so, whether the "should grant" phrase contained in the
restyled version of the rule captured that idea adequately. Commentator
after commentator urged the Committee to change the word "should" to
the word "must," or at a minimum, to restore the former phrase "shall
grant" to the rule. In the end, the Committee returned to the Prime
Directive: do not make any substantive changes in the rule. Despite its
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reservations about the word "shall," it decided that the only way to
ensure that no substantive changes were being made, and thus the only
way to return this issue to the case-by-case development it had been
undergoing, was to return to the word "shall." And so, if you look at the
language of the rule that has just taken effect, you will see in Rule 56(a)
the phrase, "The court shall grant summary judgment . . . .
What
came through during this discussion was how strongly peopleespecially the defense bar-felt about the importance of summary
judgment and what an important role summary judgment has come to
play in the litigation process.
The second focal point of the comment period concerned the
procedures to be followed in adjudicating a motion for summary
judgment. Coming from a circuit in which the largest district-the
Northern District of Illinois-uses the point-counterpoint procedure that
was part of the proposed rule, I was frankly surprised at the depth of
opposition that this provision sparked. And the source of the opposition
was also very interesting. First and foremost, it was the district judges
who objected to the nationalization of the point-counterpoint procedure.
Many of the opponents came from districts that had tried this procedure
and had found it wanting. The testimony of Judge David Hamilton, then
the Chief Judge of the Southern District of Indiana, and now my
colleague on the Seventh Circuit, captures well their objections.
Judge Hamilton began by noting that his district had adopted a local
rule in 1998 that looked very much like the Committee's proposed rule.
Critically, lawyers had to file lists of disputed material facts in a separate
document, just as the proposed rule was going to require. Judge
Hamilton reported that this unfortunately "provided a new arena for
unnecessary controversy." 54 The Southern Indiana judges began seeing
"huge, unwieldy, and especially expensive presentations of hundreds of
factual assertions .... [that] became the focus of lengthy debates over
relevance and admissibility."ss And these were cases that he described
as single-plaintiff, single-defendant, run-of-the-mill disputes.
He
recalled one such case in which a party submitted 489 paragraphs of
facts, supplemented by a total of 300 pages of briefs. In another one, the

53. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (emphasis added).
54. Hon. David F. Hamilton, Chief Judge, S. Dist. of Ind., Testimony Before the Civil
Rules Advisory Committee, San Francisco, California, 1 (Feb. 2, 2009) (transcript on file
with author).
55. Id.
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parties churned out 347 paragraphs of facts. In another, there were 548
pages of submissions on a routine summary judgment motion, where the
defendant tried to dispute 582 of the plaintiff s 675 assertions of disputed
material facts.
This is the stuff of nightmare. And similar stories caused quite a few
other district court judges to take time out of their busy schedules to
come to the Committee's hearings to plead that the new rule not adopt a
point-counterpoint procedure. Another point, shared by some plaintiffs'
lawyers, was that a great deal of duplication is inevitable if the pointcounterpoint system is used. The facts are set out in the separate
statement, but then it is necessary to address them all over again in the
briefing. It is hard to draw out inferences from facts in the separate
statement, which again forces the parties over to the briefing. Finally, as
Judge Hamilton and others noted, compelling the parties to highlight
material disputed facts in the briefs rather than in a separate statement
reintroduces the discipline of page limits to the process.
The Committee listened to these comments and amended the draft
It abandoned the proposal to require pointrule significantly.
counterpoint statements and simplified the rule so that it now reads as
follows:
(c) Procedures.
(1) Supporting Factual Positions. A party asserting that a
fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion
by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, .
or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the
absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse
party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the
fact."
In other words, as a different district judge put it, the Committee decided
that it was best to require a simple procedure and to allow a district judge
in a particular case to require more, rather than to start with a complex
procedure as the default rule and to back off to the simple when possible.
There may be a more general lesson in that shift. In a well-meaning
effort to create rules that live up to Rule l's goal of the "just, speedy, and
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
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inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding,"5 7 the
tendency has been to try to anticipate every problem and to create a rule
for everything. The Duke Conference, to which I referred earlier,
brought together a wealth of empirical information showing that Rule 1's
aspiration is far from being realized, and it might even be receding.
Most of the work done in this area has focused on discovery, and now, in
the wake of the Supreme Court's Twombly and Iqbal decisions, some
of it is now looking back at the pleadings. My point in this lecture is to
suggest that what may be even more important is to look forward to the
one moment in the litigation when all of that information collected in
discovery is sure to be used: the motion for summary judgment. I once,
in a careless moment in an opinion, called this the "put up or shut up"
moment in a case, and as a descriptive matter, that is true.
But should it be true? Do we really need a summary judgment
motion in virtually every case? What if better empirical research shows
us that summary judgment is not saving any money, from a systemic
point of view? As I indicated, one message that came through loud and
clear from the Rule 56 hearings that the Civil Rules Committee held in
2008 and 2009 is that lawyers have developed a very strong sense of
entitlement to this procedural vehicle, and that they would complain
loudly if it were taken away from them.
For that reason, District Judge Brock Hornby took the position in his
article in the Green Bag that it is pointless to approach this issue from the
tabula rasa perspective. Summary judgment is here to stay, he thinks,
and so all we can do is tinker at the edges. In that spirit, he proposes
renaming it "judgment without trial," which at least abolishes the idea
that there is anything expeditious about it. He also suggests that there
should be a public hearing before any judgment without trial is given.
This at least would bring it back out into the open and away from the
respective offices of the lawyers and the judges.
Maybe he is right, and this is all we can do. But it seems a shame to
leave matters in such an unsatisfactory state. Even if our earlier efforts
both with respect to discovery and with respect to summary judgment
have done little more than illustrate the law of unintended consequences,
we should still ask whether the lessons we have learned might help us to
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
58. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007).
59. See Homby, supra note 4.
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do better in the future.
One such lesson, reflected in the new Rule 56, is that simpler is
better. The more we put details in the rules, the more fodder we give to
lawyers who will contest every comma and adjective if they have the
chance. Simple principles, clearly stated, can be managed by responsible
trial judges. Another lesson that has prompted some amendments to
Rule 23, on class actions, but has not yet been reflected in many other
rules, relates to the economics of the legal profession. Discovery and
summary judgment are the engines of a lot of billing. No one wants to
be the lawyer who failed to ask one more question, to take one more
deposition, or to review one more document that would have made the
difference between success and failure. Yet it is well known that some
scorched-earth tactics are far out of proportion to the stakes of the case.
Perhaps, to throw out a radical suggestion, a party who wants to
move for full or partial summary judgment should be required to seek the
district judge's permission to file the motion. If the judge thought that
the motion would advance the case, he or she could grant permission and
proceed that way. But if the judge thought that the case could just as
efficiently or even more efficiently be brought to trial, then the judge
could deny the petition to file.o It is no secret that from the standpoint
of the appellate court, fully tried cases present fewer issues for review.
Summary judgments, after all, are reviewed de novo, and if the appellate
court finds that the trial judge slid too quickly over disputed issues of
material fact, back the case goes to the district court. Findings of fact by
a jury are sacrosanct under the Seventh Amendment; evidentiary rulings
and jury instructions given at trial are reviewed deferentially; and if the
trial is to the court, the findings of fact can be overturned only if they
were clearly erroneous. All in all, the appellate task is easier after a trial
than it is following summary judgment.
I am a realist, and I do not expect that anyone will want to go
forward with my proposal. What I do hope, however, is that scholars
will turn their attention to the economics of summary judgment and test
the proposition that it is a money-saver. A few people have begun this
task, and given the centrality of the motion to modem civil litigation, it
60. Indeed it seems that at least one district court judge has adopted a procedure
where parties must request permission before filing a motion for summary judgment in
particular types of civil cases. See E-mail from Chambers of Hon. David Folsom, U.S.
Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Tex., to Chambers of Hon. Diane P. Wood, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (October 25, 2010) (on file with author) (discussing such
a requirement in patent cases).
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cries out for more work. Despite the many cases that are diverted to
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, civil cases continue to occupy
an important place in both federal and state court dockets. If we have
managed this time to come up with the perfect rule on summary
judgment, then we can all breathe a sigh of relief. But if frustrations with
the system continue, it may be time for a deeper look at summary
judgment, asking whether it is part of the solution or part of the problem.
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